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FEATURE COMMENT: European 
Commission Proposes Expanding The 
European Defence Fund—A Major 
Potential Barrier To Transatlantic Defense 
Procurement
The European Commission (EC) has proposed ex-
panding the European Defence Fund, an initiative 
to fund defense technology developed in Europe. As 
a general matter, only European firms would have 
access to the fund for development, and participat-
ing European nations would need to commit them-
selves to purchasing the defense materiel developed 
under the fund. 
In effect, this could lock U.S. firms out of billions 
of euros worth of European defense procurement 
over the coming years—despite long-standing re-
ciprocal agreements under which the U.S. and its 
European allies agreed to open their defense mar-
kets. The fund was announced quietly last year and 
now, in the shadow of a trade war launched by the 
Trump administration, has evolved into a substan-
tial potential barrier in the transatlantic defense 
market, and potentially another brick in a rising 
wall of protectionism between the U.S. and Europe. 
European Union’s Efforts to Open Pro-
curement Markets—The European Defence Fund 
arose against the backdrop of long-standing efforts 
by the EU to pressure other nations, including the 
U.S., to expand access to their procurement mar-
kets. The EU “International Procurement Instru-
ment,” for example, was first proposed in 2012 as a 
regulation that would allow European governments 
to discriminate against nations which refuse to 
cooperate in negotiations on opening procurement 
markets. See “Commission Amended Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on the Access of Third-Party Goods and 
Services to the Union’s Internal Market in Public 
Procurement and Procedures Supporting Negotia-
tions on Access of Union Goods and Services to the 
Public Procurement Markets of Third Countries,” 
COM (2016) 34 final (Jan. 1, 2016), available at 
www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheproce-
dure.do?reference=2012/0060(COD)&l=en; Harte, 
European Parliamentary Research Service, “Brief-
ing: International Procurement Instrument” (De-
cember 2017), available at www.europarl.europa. 
eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/614610/EPRS_
BRI(2017)614610_EN.pdf; Grier, “EU: Penalizing 
Closed Procurement Markets” (Feb. 16, 2016), 
available at trade.djaghe.com/?tag=international-
procurement-instrument&paged=2. 
Some of the likeliest targets of discrimination 
under the proposed regulation would be China 
(which has been stuck in limbo for years in its nego-
tiations to accede to the World Trade Organization 
Government Procurement Agreement), and the 
U.S. (the Europeans are intent on gaining greater 
access to U.S. state and local procurement markets). 
See generally Grier, “Do Open Markets Decrease 
China’s Incentive to Join GPA” (Nov. 2, 2017), 
available at trade.djaghe.com/?tag=international-
procurement-instrument. 
The proposed International Procurement 
Instrument has shuttled for years between the 
European Parliament and committee, and was to 
be considered by committee on June 21—like the 
European Defence Fund, possibly another step 
towards an open fight over procurement between 
the EU and the U.S. See generally European Parlia-
ment, Legislative Observatory, available at www.
europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.
do?reference=2012/0060(COD)&l=en (procedure 
file); Dawar, “The 2016 EU International Procure-
ment Instrument’s Amendments to the 2012 Buy 
European Proposal: A Retrospective Assessment 
of Its Prospects,” 50 J. World Trade 845 (2016) 
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(tracing the European initiative to U.S. protectionist 
models), available at sro.sussex.ac.uk/60062/1/K%20
Dawar%20JWT%20submission%202016%20IPI%20
Amended%20Proposal.pdf. 
Emergence of the European Defence Fund—
Although the concept for the European Defence Fund 
emerged in late 2016, see “EU Proposes Common De-
fense Fund,” 58 GC ¶ 435(a), President Trump acceler-
ated the initiative when in May 2017 he scolded Eu-
ropean leaders for not spending enough on their own 
defense, see, e.g., Emmott, “Trump Effect? Europe’s 
Defense Spending to Rise Faster in 2017,” Reuters, 
June 28, 2017, available at www.reuters.com/article/
us-nato-defence-idUSKBN19J0ZW. Shortly thereafter, 
in June 2017, the EU announced specific plans for 
the European Defence Fund, see EC, Press Release: 
A European Defence Fund: $5.5 Billion Per Year to 
Boost Europe’s Defence Capabilities (Brussels, June 
7, 2017), an initiative lauded by some for fostering 
investment and development in the European defense 
sector, see, e.g., Brattberg and Fly, “Two Cheers for 
European Defense Cooperation,” Foreign Policy March 
9, 2018, available at foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/09/
two-cheers-for-european-defense-cooperation/. 
Although last year’s proposal already contem-
plated a focused effort to nurture the European de-
fense industry, this year’s announcement marked a 
broader effort to fund European defense innovations 
from within—and to keep non-European firms from 
sharing in the fruits of that investment. See EC, Press 
Release: EU Budget: Stepping Up the EU’s Role as a 
Security and Defence Provider (Strasbourg, June 13, 
2018), available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
18-4121_en.htm.
In its most recent announcement on June 13, 
the European Commission proposed a budget of 
€13 billion for 2021–2027 for the European Defence 
Fund, see, e.g., EC, Fact Sheet: European Defence 
Fund, available at ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/
beta-political/files/budget-may2018-eu-defence-
fund_en.pdf, substantially more than the funding 
initially proposed last year. The new fund will be used 
to support innovation and development in defense 
across Europe. The EC stressed the fragmentation 
and inefficiencies that can cripple the European 
defense industry, and the need to foster cooperation 
among European firms to encourage a strong, coor-
dinated defense industrial base in Europe. See, e.g., 
EC, Commission Staff Working Document: Impact 
Assessment, SWD (2018) 345 (June 13, 2018), avail-
able at ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/
files/budget-may2018-eu-defence-fund-swd_en.pdf. 
The expanded European Defence Fund would be 
available only to defense initiatives spanning three 
or more European member states, and the fund could 
be used only to develop (not purchase) new defense 
systems; member states would have to commit in 
advance to purchasing the new systems, using the 
member states’ own funds. The regulation proposed 
to implement the initiative made clear that the pro-
posed fund is as much about industrial policy as it is 
about defense: the fund would be used to foster small- 
and mid-sized companies in the European member 
states, with an eye to economic development as well 
as defense security. See EC, Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council Es-
tablishing the European Defence Fund, COM (2018) 
476 (Brussels, June 13, 2018), available at ec.europa.
eu/commiss ion/sites/beta-political/files/budget-
may2018-eu-defence-fund-regulation_en.pdf. By the 
terms of the proposed regulation (discussed further 
below), presumptively the European Defence Fund 
would be used exclusively to support European firms.
U.S.-EU Trade Disputes and the New Fund—
The European Defence Fund’s expansion did not, of 
course, happen in isolation. Although European poli-
cymakers were careful to stress that the fund was not 
a “reaction” to the Trump administration, see, e.g., Re-
marks by High Representative/Vice-President Federi-
ca Mogherini (June 13, 2018), available at eeas.euro-
pa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/46450/
remarks-hrvp-mogherini-press-conference-european-
defence-fund-european-peace-facility-and_en, these 
latest steps were taken against the backdrop of 
a gathering trade war and ongoing uncertainties 
about the U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, see, e.g., Taylor, “Trump’s Next 
Target: NATO,” Politico, June 14, 2018, available at 
www.politico.eu/article/will-donald-trump-wreck-
nato-summit-too-g7/. The Trump administration has 
announced that it will impose steep tariffs against 
European steel and aluminum, and the EU has said 
that it will respond in kind against goods and services 
from the U.S. See, e.g., Petroff, “Trump Is Starting 
a Global Trade War,” CNN Money (June 1, 2018), 
available at money.cnn.com/2018/05/31/investing/
us-steel-aluminum-tariffs-response/index.html. 
The European initiative also came in the wake 
of the Trump administration’s own efforts to boost 
foreign military sales by U.S. firms, see National 
Vol. 60, No. 24 / June 27, 2018 
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Security Presidential Memorandum Regarding U.S. 
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (April 19, 2018); 
“White House Rolls Out Arms Transfer Policy, Drone 
Sales Priorities,” 60 GC ¶ 146, and concern among 
some U.S. policymakers that President Trump is 
squandering the U.S.’ goodwill with its allies.
Will the New Fund Violate Reciprocal De-
fense Procurement Agreements?—From a U.S. 
perspective, the unanswered question is whether 
the European Defence Fund will, in fact, be a bar-
rier to U.S. firms in the European defense market. 
Though one senior EU policymaker argued that “the 
United States understand[s] perfectly well that Eu-
ropean money goes to support European projects,” 
see Remarks by High Representative/Vice-President 
Federica Mogherini, supra, and a number of observ-
ers read the new initiative to mean that U.S. firms 
will be locked out, see “EU to Block UK, US from €13 
Billion ‘European Defence Fund’; Programme Bid to 
Guarantee Member States’ Security,” World Agence 
France-Presse, June 13, 2018, available at www.
firstpost.com/world/eu-to-block-uk-and-us-from-e13-
billion-european-defence-fund-programme-a-bid-to-
guarantee-member-states-security-4508597.html, the 
proposed implementing regulation was less than clear 
on this important point.
On one hand, the EC’s proposed regulation was 
explicitly protectionist. The EC noted that because 
the fund “aims at enhancing the competitiveness, effi-
ciency and autonomy of the Union’s defence industry,” 
only entities “established in the Union or associated 
countries and not subject to control by non-associated 
third countries or non-associated third country enti-
ties” (such as U.S.-based firms) “should in principle be 
eligible for support.” Furthermore, the proposed regu-
lation warned, “in order to ensure the protection of es-
sential security and defence interests” of the EU and 
its member states—a phrase that normally signals a 
derogation from open-market obligations under trade 
agreements—“the infrastructure, facilities, assets 
and resources used by the recipients and their sub-
contractors in actions supported by the Fund should 
not be located on the territory of non-associated third 
countries.” Taken on their face, these provisions would 
seem to mean that no part of the work supported by 
the fund could be done in the U.S., or by a U.S.-based 
or -controlled contractor or subcontractor.
At the same time, however, the proposed regula-
tion seemed to leave the door open to possible in-
volvement by U.S. firms. “In certain circumstances,” 
said the proposed regulation, “if this is necessary for 
achieving the objectives of the action, it should be 
possible to derogate from the principle that recipients 
and their subcontractors should not be subject to con-
trol by non-associated third countries or non-associat-
ed third country entities.” To involve a non-European 
firm, applicants would have to show that “relevant 
and strict conditions relating to the security and de-
fence interests of the Union and its Member States 
are fulfilled,” and the “participation of such entities 
should not contravene the objectives of the Fund.” The 
proposed regulation did not explain, however, what 
the “strict conditions” are; nor did it explain when, 
exactly, participation by a non-European firm might 
“contravene the objectives of the fund.”
Nor—and critically—did the proposed regulation 
squarely address many European states’ standing 
obligations to keep their defense markets open to 
U.S.-based firms, under the reciprocal defense pro-
curement agreements that the U.S. has entered into 
with the majority of its European allies. Of the 28 
EU member states and four European Free Trade 
Association nations (which also may participate 
in the fund, under appropriate circumstances), 21 
nations have entered into these reciprocal agree-
ments with the U.S., and so generally have agreed 
not to discriminate in their purchases of defense 
materiel and services. See Department of Defense, 
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Re-
ciprocal Defense Procurement and Acquisition 
Policy Memoranda of Understanding, available 
at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/cpic/ic/reciprocal_ 
procurement_memoranda_of_understanding.html. 
The U.S. commitments under the reciprocal agree-
ments are written into the Defense Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation Supplement, see DFARS 226.872, 
and those commitments to open DOD purchases to 
vendors from “qualifying” (signatory) countries are 
a recognized part of U.S defense procurement. See, 
e.g., Yukins and Ramish, Feature Comment, “Section 
809 And ‘e-Portal’ Proposals, By Cutting Bid Protests 
In Federal Procurement, Could Breach International 
Agreements And Raise New Risks Of Corruption,” 60 
GC ¶ 138 (discussing agreements).
The EC’s proposal does not explain whether the 
reciprocal defense procurement agreements with the 
U.S. will be honored—and so leaves open the possi-
bility that the European Defence Fund will become a 
new battleground in the ongoing trade wars between 
the U.S. and Europe.
 The Government Contractor ®
4 © 2018 Thomson Reuters
¶ 196
Potential Impact of a Trade War in the 
Transatlantic Defense Market—A trade war in 
defense would not be good news for the U.S., for both 
economic and security reasons. The U.S. enjoys a 
large and long-standing trade surplus with Europe 
in defense equipment, see, e.g., “The Nature and Im-
pacts of Barriers to Trade with the United States for 
European Defence Industries” (No. ENTR 08/040) (EC 
December 2009), available at ec.europa.eu/growth/
sectors/defence/industrial-policy_en, and U.S. defense 
firms could be hurt if a “European preference” took 
hold in the EU’s defense markets. See generally But-
ler, Transatlantic Defence Procurement (Cambridge 
U. Press 2017).
The loss to the U.S. would go beyond lost exports. 
As a matter of policy, the U.S. has long worked to 
open foreign defense markets, on a reciprocal basis, 
partly to share the cost burdens of weapons develop-
ment, but also to foster closer military cooperation 
between the U.S. and its allies. See, e.g., Miller, “Is 
It Time To Reform Reciprocal Defense Procurement 
Agreements?,” 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 93, 96 (2009); Bi-
alos, Fisher and Koehl, “Fortresses and Icebergs: The 
Evolution of the Transatlantic Defense Market and 
Its Implications for U.S. National Security Policy” 
(Brookings 2009). In doing so, DOD has sought to 
enhance a common defense with its allies by encour-
aging interoperability between U.S. and allied defense 
systems. If the European Defence Fund ultimately 
locks out U.S. defense firms from new European 
defense initiatives, although interoperability among 
European defense systems may improve, ready in-
teroperability—and a coordinated defense—between 
the U.S. and its European allies may well suffer.
F
This Feature Comment was written for The Gov-
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